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of documents from the Sugar Re-
search Foundation demonstrated 
that the sugar industry success-
fully sought to deflect the con-
cerns of health-conscious consum-
ers from sugar to fat.5 Many 
countries have curtailed advertis-
ing aimed at young people by the 
food industry. Tax policies are 
increasingly being used to reduce 
consumption of sugar-sweetened 
beverages in U.S. jurisdictions 
and elsewhere, but the American 
Beverage Association has vigor-
ously opposed these 
efforts, including by 
supporting state pre-
emption. A San Francisco policy 
that is currently being adjudicat-
ed would support the potential 
use of warning labels on sugar-
sweetened beverages.
The table presents potential 
provisions that could result from 
litigation or voluntary settlements 
with these industries and provi-
sions contained in the MSA. 
Combined with tobacco use, 
these epidemics (excluding cli-
mate change, for which U.S. data 
are unavailable) cause nearly one 
third of all U.S. deaths. The tra-
jectory of these major public 
health problems could be altered 
by reducing industry manipula-
tion of science and lobbying for 
policies against the public inter-
est; compensating public coffers 
for money spent combating these 
epidemics and redirecting funds 
to prevention; and using public 
education, product warnings, 
and price increases to reduce 
use of harmful products. By using 
these strategies, state AGs could 
strengthen their consumer-protec-
tion roles as guardians of the 
health of the public.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available at NEJM.org.
From the New York University College of 
Global Public Health, New York. 
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Pharmaceuticals are consuming increasingly large portions of 
U.S. state budgets, and high prices 
are preventing patients from get-
ting, and adhering to, essential 
medicines. In mid-May 2018, Pres-
ident Donald Trump announced a 
heavily hyped but relatively mod-
est federal plan to bring down 
drug prices. Meanwhile, several 
states are moving forward with 
their own solutions, and Mary-
land’s approach is particularly am-
bitious. In 2017, responding to 
notorious cases such as the 5000% 
increase in the cost of Daraprim 
(pyrimethamine) and the 10-fold 
increase in the cost of EpiPens 
(epinephrine auto-injectors), Mary-
land enacted a statute that pro-
hibits manufacturers from “price 
gouging” on any “essential off-
patent or generic drug” (see box).
But in April 2018, a panel of 
the federal Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned the statute. 
The two-judge majority reasoned 
that the state could not regulate 
the prices charged by manufac-
turers, because they sold to whole-
salers in transactions that oc-
curred “wholly” out of state.1 The 
court invoked the “dormant com-
merce clause,” the legal doctrine 
holding that the Constitution im-
plicitly restricts states from inter-
fering with interstate commerce, 
even when Congress has been 
silent regarding the activity in 
question.
One judge dissented, arguing 
that the Maryland law targets only 
the prices paid for products that 
reach Maryland buyers. Manufac-
turers could simply earmark their 
Maryland-bound transactions and 
price them to comply with that 
state’s laws.
Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that states are free 
to impose greater or lesser tort 
liabilities on drugs approved by 
the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). In the U.S. constitu-
tional system, states are the “lab-
oratories of democracy” that have 
the power to regulate on virtually 
any subject.2 As the dissent noted, 
“numerous States impose safety, 
quality, and labeling restrictions 
on goods sold by out-of-state man-
ufacturers through out-of-state dis-
tributors to in-state consumers.”1
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In some ways, the Maryland 
decision echoes the historic Loch-
ner decision of 1905, in which the 
Supreme Court invoked a “liber-
ty of contract” to strike down a 
New York law regulating the 
number of hours per week that 
bakers could work.3 In the Loch-
ner era, the Supreme Court rou-
tinely and creatively invented con-
stitutional provisions to undermine 
progressive state laws. Today, this 
sort of judicial meddling is widely 
condemned as contrary to democ-
racy and federalism. Like the lib-
erty of contract invoked in Loch-
ner, the dormant commerce clause 
is not explicitly laid out in the 
Constitution itself.
The dormant commerce clause 
arises only from a sense of the 
framers’ larger purpose: to create 
a single economic union, in which 
states would not exercise protec-
tionism to favor local producers. 
Yet the Maryland law is not pro-
tectionist. It is not as if Maryland 
burdened drug makers in New 
Jersey and Virginia in order to fa-
vor their Maryland competitors, 
which is the paradigmatic vio-
lation. The Supreme Court has 
struck down such an arrange-
ment when New York tried to fa-
vor local milk producers by pro-
hibiting out-of-state producers 
from undercutting their prices. 
The Court has also struck down 
laws that pegged local beer prices 
to those offered in other states, 
because such laws could cause 
manufacturers to raise their prices 
in other states. Here, Maryland 
used no such interstate price peg.
Maryland’s statute also avoids 
conflict with federal patent law, 
which purposefully gives inven-
tors a monopoly as an incentive. 
High prices are part of the de-
sign of that federal regime, and 
states cannot interfere with that 
goal. In contrast, the Maryland 
law focuses on generic drugs.
The State of Maryland has 
asked that all the judges on the 
Fourth Circuit sit together to re-
view the case. The U.S. Supreme 
Court may also do so. Either court 
could reverse the panel decision. 
Congress could also authorize 
states to experiment.
If all else fails, the state legis-
lature may try to craft another 
solution that avoids the panel’s 
opinion. One approach would be 
to regulate prices charged to con-
sumers and payers within the 
state and allow economic forces 
to work their way up the supply 
line to the price-gouging manu-
facturers. If a retailer is unable 
to sell at an exorbitant price, then 
wholesalers and manufacturers 
will be unable to charge unrea-
sonably high prices in the first 
place.
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld a dif-
ferent sort of pharmaceutical stat-
ute in Maine.4 Maine linked its 
Medicaid and uninsured self-pay 
markets by imposing a prior- 
authorization requirement on ex-
pensive drugs sold in its Medic-
aid system unless manufacturers 
agreed to pay a rebate to subsi-
dize private purchases. By target-
ing transactions within the state, 
this law reached the manufactur-
ers regardless of their out-of-state 
wholesalers.
Under any such policy, it will 
remain difficult and contentious 
to determine what is and is not 
an “unconscionable” price and to 
set the amount of any required 
rebate. Without a more compre-
hensive system of value-based 
pricing, an ad hoc approach will 
only generate more litigation. 
More important, small states act-
ing alone run the risk that the 
manufacturer may just walk away, 
refusing to sell at a cut rate. But 
that’s the nature of a bargain 
with a monopolist.
A better approach, I would ar-
gue, is to bring more generics 
into the market, creating options 
for states and buyers, which will 
drive down prices. Although the 
FDA approved a record number of 
generics in 2017,5 there are still 
cases in which the FDA has 
 authorized no competitors to a 
given product, leaving pharma-
ceutical companies with effective 
monopolies. Some potential com-
petitors are barred in the United 
States, even though the products 
are working safely and effectively 
in Canada and Europe. National 
borders are, in this sense, harm-
ing American patients and pay-
ers. Transnational regulatory reci-
procity would increase competition 
and drive down prices.
Where consumers have no meaningful choice about an important drug and there is 
a lack of competition, the statute prohibits “price gouging”:
• Targeting “unconscionable” price increases, defined as “excessive and not justi-
fied by the cost of producing” or expanding access to the drug;
• Applying only to generic medications (for which all exclusive marketing rights 
and patents have expired); and
• Applying only to essential medicines, as designated by the World Health Organi-
zation or the Maryland Secretary of Health;
The law authorizes the Attorney General to petition a court to restore money to con-
sumers, require manufacturers to provide the drug at the last permissible price, and 
order civil penalties.
Maryland’s HB 631, “An Act concerning Public Health — Essential Off-Patent  
or Generic Drugs — Price Gouging — Prohibition”
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In May 2018, Vermont passed 
a law tasking a state agency with 
designing a program for import-
ing drugs from Canada, but such 
a move also requires federal ap-
proval. Giving some preliminary 
credence to this approach, in July 
2018, Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services Alex Azar directed 
the FDA to establish a working 
group on drug importation as a 
means of fighting generic price 
hikes.
A promising solution is found 
in an initiative led by Intermoun-
tain Healthcare and involving sev-
eral major hospital groups and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. 
Announced in January 2018, this 
nonprofit consortium will use a 
novel contracting mechanism to 
manufacture essential generic 
drugs. When progress is stymied 
by politics and the courts, inno-
vation may find another path.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available at NEJM.org.
From the University of Arizona College of 
Law and the University of Arizona Regula-
tory Science Program — both in Tucson. 
This article was published on August 8, 
2018, at NEJM.org.
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Throughout the United States, escalating drug prices are put-
ting immense pressure on state 
budgets. Several states are look-
ing for ways to push back. Last 
year, Massachusetts asked the 
Trump administration for a waiver 
that would, among other things, 
allow its Medicaid program to 
decline to cover costly drugs for 
which there is limited or inade-
quate evidence of clinical effi-
cacy.1 By credibly threatening to 
exclude such drugs from cover-
age, Massachusetts hoped to ex-
tract price concessions and con-
strain the fastest-growing part of 
its Medicaid budget.
In late June, however, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) denied Massachu-
setts’ request.2 On the same day, 
the agency issued a memorandum 
clarifying that, under requirements 
included in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, state 
Medicaid programs are legally 
obliged to cover all drugs ap-
proved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) — includ-
ing those approved under the 
agency’s less rigorous accelerated-
approval pathway.3
Many of these drugs — in-
cluding some with uncertain ef-
ficacy — are very expensive. 
Take, for example, Exondys 51 
(eteplirsen), which was approved 
for the treatment of Duchenne’s 
muscular dystrophy on the basis 
of a trial that involved 12 boys 
and used a surrogate end point. 
The drug’s label states that “a 
clinical benefit of Exondys 51 
has not been established,” yet the 
retail price of the drug is about 
$300,000 per year. State Medic-
aid programs don’t pay full price 
— that same 1990 legislation en-
titles them to a discount that to-
day amounts to at least 23% of 
the drug’s average sales price. 
Even so, drugs like Exondys 51 
are straining state budgets.
To reduce the burden of high-
cost, low-value drugs, Massachu-
setts has proposed establishing a 
closed formulary, in which certain 
drugs can be excluded from cov-
erage. The Trump administration 
might have been expected to 
welcome the proposal. At least 
rhetorically, it is committed to 
reducing drug prices. And closed 
formularies are ubiquitous in pri-
vate insurance and public health 
care programs alike. The Veterans 
Health Administration uses one, 
and Medicare Part D plans can 
exclude certain products.
So why not let Massachusetts 
try a closed formulary for Medic-
aid? CMS’s letter to the state 
doesn’t say. It is silent on what 
exactly is deficient about Massa-
chusetts’ request. The letter does 
claim that CMS “would be will-
ing to consider” a closed formu-
lary — but only if Massachusetts 
both gives up the steep discounts 
that it’s entitled to by law and 
demonstrates that its Medicaid 
spending won’t increase because 
of the changes.
Together, these requirements 
create an insuperable obstacle to 
any closed formulary. Under CMS’s 
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